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Abstract
Highly concentrated banking system risks and the cumulative effect due to their accumu-
lation act as a driver for improving the macro-prudential policy implemented by central 
banks. For this reason, an effectively and comprehensively assessed systemic risk in the 
banking system is declared an express condition for the early detection of its production 
sources and blocking of potential spreading channels, reducing the possible implementa-
tion. In light of this, the article develops an approach to the aggregated systemic risk assess-
ment and interpretation of its results. The proposed approach is based on the considered 
influence exerted by financial risks of systemically important banks on the destabilized 
banking system and interconnections between banks in the context of the possible cri-
sis impulse spreading. The following steps should be accomplished to form an aggregated 
systemic risk indicator in the banking system. Firstly, the differentiation of systemically 
important banks by the degree of their systemic importance; secondly, an integral assess-
ment of the bank operation riskiness within certain bank groups; thirdly, the cumulative 
composition of the corresponding integral indicators, taking into account their weighting 
coefficients based on two criteria, namely values of the systemic importance indicator dif-
ferentiating the bank groups, and the correlation of their risks. Interpreting the quantitative 
measurement results with regard to the systemic risk in the banking system is followed by 
the recommendations below: the systemic risk grading into high, medium and low lev-
els and the respective definition of the threshold aggregated systemic risk indicator value 
which informs about the possible systemic crisis when approached; justification of the se-
lected supervision regime types (strengthened, moderate or weakened) for systemically im-
portant banks, depending on the riskiness level specific for their operation and the systemic 
importance degree. The developed approach to measuring the systemic risk by means of 
constructing an aggregated indicator and interpreting the obtained results was being tested 
considering the financial risk indicators of the systemically important banks in Ukraine 
during 2009–2018.
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INTRODUCTION
Naturally, the banking system, as well as the entire financial system, 
are prone to producing risks that spread rapidly to other economy sec-
tors. Consequently, the cyclical banking crisis nature, as well as the 
banking system impact on the payment status, money turnover and 
real economy financing, determine the urgency to ensure its stability 
through the early detected and neutralized systemic crisis processes. 
This issue is solved today within the macro-prudential policy imple-
mented by central banks, which is focused on assessing the systemic 
risks for financial stability and developing measures aimed to neutral-
ize them. 
Maintaining the banking system stability is relevant and represents 
a severe issue for Ukraine as well, since the country is one of the top 
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three world leaders with regard to the intensity of the systemic banking crisis occurrence (International 
Monetary Fund, 2018). Moreover, the state invested a lot in overcoming the recent banking crisis; its 
expenditures amounted to 15.8% of GDP, according to the National Bank of Ukraine (in 2014 – 2.4%, in 
2015 – 4.5%, in 2016 – 5.7%, and in 2017 – 3.2%).
Despite the fact that the Ukrainian banking system has been refreshed and cleared of troubled banks in 
view of the most recent years resulting in certain positive changes, the banking system remains highly 
vulnerable. This is confirmed by the NBU’s published results of the stress testing targeted at the major 
banks, which took place in 2018. In total, 13 out of 24 stress-tested banks accounting for more than 94% 
of banking system assets were declared requiring additional capitalization (in the amount of UAH 42.1 
billion), which indicates their inability to stay afloat while being influenced by factors destabilizing their 
activity and the possible systemic risk accumulation. In light of this, stabilizing the banking system con-
dition and ensuring financial stability as a whole represent the target priorities of the NBU’s activity, as 
announced in the National Bank Strategy and the Macro-Prudential Policy Strategy. 
Therefore, this article is intended to develop the approach to quantitative systemic risk measurement in 
the banking system and interpretation of the assessment results for further consideration while imple-
menting the macro-prudential policy. 
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
Recently, the modern economic scientific litera-
ture has paid increasing attention to the system-
ic risk concept and its measurement issues. In 
this respect, unlike with other concepts, there is 
almost no confrontation on the term “systemic 
risk” among scholars and economists, as well as 
no significant disputes have occurred regarding 
its interpretation. This is evidenced by the existing 
substantially similar concepts of “systemic risk”, 
including in particular the following: the risk or 
likelihood of the systemic failures (Kaufman & 
Scott, 2003); the risk of the entire financial system 
collapse (Borri et al., 2012); the possibility that the 
financial system may become unstable (Murphy, 
2012); the risk of failures incurred by financial in-
stitutions or the capital market freezing (Acharya 
et al., 2009); the risk of financial service distur-
bance (IMF, 2009), etc. And when it comes to the 
systemic risk causes and consequences, then the 
firms belief is that the systemic risk is most often 
caused by failures in the operation of large inter-
connected financial institutions, which not only 
destabilizes the financial system, but also negative-
ly affects the real economy. Therefore, the key sys-
temic risk concept aspects are reasonably reflected 
in the chain “infectious agents – mechanisms and 
channels of their spread – the scale of consequenc-
es”. From this perspective, the systemic risk in the 
banking system can be defined as the risk of its 
destabilization arising from the growing financial 
vulnerability of banks (typically, this refers to sys-
temically important banks or SIBs), which in turn 
catalyzes the processes of crisis impulse spreading 
to other banking institutions (the infection devel-
ops through the credit and financial ties among 
banks resulting from their financial relations and 
gains strength with the panic spreading through 
information flows) and consequently leads the 
banking system to inability to fully perform its 
functions. However, it is fair to note that, in addi-
tion to the negative consequences resulting from 
the systemic risk materialization, positive effects 
are also possible, though they hardly ever occur. 
For instance, De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) 
point at this fact. In their view, some financial cri-
ses are able to simply eliminate inefficient system 
players, particularly when asymmetric informa-
tion prevents the market mechanism from per-
forming its activities. 
As for the systemic risk measurement, research-
ers deal with this issue more actively. In particu-
lar, scholars suggest systematizing the assessment 
methods, taking into account their common fea-
tures, test and analyze the results through empiri-
cal research, improvement, and communicate the 
advantages and disadvantages of certain ones. For 
instance, Borri et al. (2012) summarize the exist-
ing literature on the systemic risk assessment in 
the banking system in two directions: a network 
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analysis and a micro-evidence approach being de-
veloped by researchers, which proceeds from spe-
cific bank variables and is meant to quantitatively 
determinate their contributions to the systemic 
risk. Gerlach (2009) and Cerutti et al. (2012) iden-
tify three approaches to the systemic risk assess-
ment. Thus, as follows from Gerlach (2009), the 
appropriate approaches include: monitoring of ag-
gregated indicators of solvency or financial stabili-
ty; measuring bank interconnections; and analyz-
ing changes in financial asset prices. Cerutti et аl. 
(2012) emphasize the approaches to assessing the 
systemic risk based on the bank balance intercon-
nectivity (affecting the spreading shocks), as well 
as approaches to assessing the systemic risk pre-
mium and shock interconnections (using the mar-
ket information on credit spreads and share prices 
or other assets). Furthermore, the authors outline 
a long-term approach as a third approach based on 
modeling (simulation and scenario analysis meth-
ods) and that allows for better understanding of 
how specific shock types can provoke system-lev-
el events. Di Cesare and Picco (2018) provide rec-
ommendations similar to the previously discussed 
ones aimed at comparing the systemic risk assess-
ment methods. Thus, the authors differentiate the 
expected loss in case of failures in the operation of 
financial institutions (banks), indicators of their 
possible default, indicators that illustrate the spe-
cific infection mechanisms and indicators of the 
general “disaster” level in the system based on the 
main systemic risk features, which can cover the 
basic indicators. In addition, Di Cesare and Picco 
(2018) suggest comparing the appropriate meth-
ods and other criteria, namely: availability (with 
regard to the ability to predict system events, im-
plementation simplicity, etc.); theoretical founda-
tions taken into account and analytical methods 
used.
The outlined suggestions in respect to grouping 
the systemic risk assessment approaches have both 
common features and differences. The first point 
is related to certain aspects defined as the main 
ones in the classification division of the existing 
assessment methods, and the second point refers 
to the extent of the researchers’ coverage of their 
various quantities. However, introduction into the 
peculiarities of the methodological support im-
plementation as for measuring the systemic risk 
also allows us to conclude that when certain cri-
teria are distinguished with the aim to group the 
methods, some scholars put aside their intercross-
ing. In particular, this includes combining both 
bank balance sheets and market data, as well as 
taking into account possible defaults of banking 
institutions. Considering the above, it is advisable 
to review three approaches from the perspective of 
summarizing the key aspects for the systemic risk 
assessment in the banking system and the differ-
entiation of its methods: 
• the first approach is aimed at determining the 
banking system losses (damages); 
• the second approach evaluates the influence 
of banks’ interconnections on the spreading 
shocks (the infection effect); and
• the third approach defines the aggregated in-
dicators that demonstrate the stress level and 
the imbalance accumulation in the banking 
system. 
The methods that are combined within the first 
approach to the systemic risk measurement and 
are considered by modern researchers include: 
conditional value at risk or CoVar (Adrian & 
Brunnermeier, 2011; Borri et al., 2012; Karimalis 
& Nomikos, 2014; Huang et al., 2015; Teply & 
Kvapilikova, 2017, etc.); systemic expected shortfall 
or SES (Acharya et al., 2010); marginal expected 
shortfall or MES (Acharya et al., 2010; Brownlees 
& Engle, 2012; Yun & Moon, 2014; Huang et al., 
2015; etc.); systemic contingent claims analysis 
or Systemic CCA (Capera et al., 2011); distress 
insurance premium or DIP (Huang et al., 2009), 
and SRISK (Brownlees & Engle, 2017; Foggitt et 
al., 2017). 
It should be noted that Adrian and Brunnermeier 
(2011) suggested fundamentals for the develop-
ment and use of CoVaR. With allowance for their 
findings, CoVaR is defined as value at risk (VaR) 
in the financial system influenced by financial in-
stitutions that are in the critical condition. In this 
context, CoVaR, namely the contribution made by 
an institution to the systemic risk, is evaluated as 
the difference between the conditional CoVaR for 
the institution being in the critical condition and 
CoVaR for the same institution being in the “me-
dian” condition. Borri et al. (2012) and Karkowska 
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(2015) emphasize the advantages peculiar for this 
method (in particular, the possibility to identify 
the recapitalization need for the banking system 
and banks’ contributions to the systemic risk) in 
the context of the analytical study implementation 
with regard to the systemic risk assessment in the 
European banking area. Karimalis and Nomikos 
(2014), Teply and Kvapilikova (2017) also review 
the feasibility of using CoVaR to measure the sys-
temic risk in the banking system, and determine 
the need to improve this method using the copula 
functions (Karimalis & Nomikos, 2014) and wave-
let analysis (Teply & Kvapilikova, 2017).
Acharya et al. (2010) proposed a systemic expected 
shortfall (SES) to measure the systemic risk and 
predict losses during the financial crisis, general-
izing the insufficient capitalization tendency un-
der the system recession conditions shown by fi-
nancial institutions. It is important to note that a 
marginal expected shortfall (MES) is used when 
calculating SES. At the same time, MES is also 
considered by Acharya et al. (2010), Brownlees 
and Engle (2012) and other researchers as an indi-
vidual systemic risk measure. In particular, MES 
is considered in the Yun and Moon (2014) study 
in the context of practical use while assessing the 
systemic risk in the Korean banking system. In 
compliance with the economic interpretation of 
the Yun and Moon (2014) study results, the sys-
temic risk indicator reflects the marginal expect-
ed revenue shortfall on the stock portfolio of in-
dividual banks in conditions where market yields 
are lower than a certain threshold. There is an ap-
proach based on the distress insurance premium 
definition, which is similar to the MES according 
to the logic of use while measuring the systemic 
risk (presented in Huang et al., 2009). As speci-
fied in the method outlined by Huang et al. (2009), 
determining the systemic risk level includes form-
ing a hypothetical portfolio composed of debt in-
struments issued by the analyzed banks, weight-
ed by the size of their liabilities. Accordingly, the 
systemic risk indicator reflects the theoretical in-
surance premium (the cost of insurance against 
financial difficulties), which protects against the 
problem losses of this portfolio in the next 12 
weeks. When measuring the systemic risk, Huang 
et al. (2009) take into consideration the possible 
default of individual banks and the predicted data 
on asset return correlations.
The SRISK and systemic contingent claims anal-
ysis also relate to the first group of approaches to 
the systemic risk measurement in the banking sys-
tem and have much in common with the meth-
ods discussed above. For instance, SRISK (as pro-
posed by Brownlees and Engle (2017) and used by 
Foggitt et al. (2017) to measure the systemic risk in 
the banking system of South Africa) also general-
izes the banks’ insufficient capitalization tendency 
(defines a capital shortage in a system event) and is 
determined relying on both MES and SES. In turn, 
according to Capera et al. (2011), the systemic con-
tingent claims analysis is a more flexible and com-
prehensive tool for measuring the systemic risk in 
the banking system when compared with CoVaR, 
SES and DIP. The Capera et al. (2011) study (the 
proposals for the systemic risk assessment were 
tested relying on the sampled data of the four ma-
jor banks of Colombia) represents a conclusion 
within the corresponding approach relating to the 
practicability of determining the losses incurred 
by banks considering their possible default and 
determining the distance-to-default.
The methods for assessing the systemic risk in the 
banking system, which are most often referred to 
the second approach, include: a network analy-
sis, a risk correlation-based approach (a co-risk 
model), distress dependence matrix design, a de-
fault intensity model approach, etc. (IMF Global 
Financial Stability Report, 2009; Gerlach, 2009; 
Di Cesare & Picco, 2018). At the same time, the 
network analysis, which involves the banking 
network design following on from the identified 
ties among banks (including, but not limited to 
the interbank credit market) and allows for pre-
dicting the consequences of possible stress events, 
is the most common in the researchers’ articles 
dealing with this approach to the systemic risk 
measurement (in particular, Cont et al., 2010; 
Hu et al., 2012; Gudelytė & Navickienė, 2013; 
Fan еt al., 2018, etc.). Meanwhile, Gudelytė and 
Navickienė (2013) emphasize not only the advan-
tages but also the disadvantages of the network 
analysis. Thus, among its advantages the authors 
mention the easy interpreted usage results; the 
banking sector structure reflection; the identified 
systemic risk sources and assessment of the possi-
bly implementing the infection effect of banking 
institutions; the shaped possible scenario of the 
banking system collapse. As for the disadvantag-
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es, the unclear reasons for the bank default are 
named (according to the researchers, they should 
be determined upon a fundamental analysis of 
the bank balance structure and assessment of 
macroeconomic conditions in which these banks 
operate). Report to the G-20 Finance Ministers 
and Central Bank Governors (IMF, 2009), in 
which the network analysis, along with portfolio 
models of risk and stress testing, are considered 
as approaches to the identification of systemical-
ly important banks, also highlights the network 
analysis difficulties. In particular, the document 
indicates the possibility of cross-sectoral insti-
tutional influences, as well as the likelihood of a 
rapid change in actual ties (illustrating the fact 
that the analysis results may be limited in effect).
As previously noted, the third distinguished ap-
proach to the systemic risk assessment involves 
determining its aggregated level based on fi-
nancial imbalance data in the banking system. 
Proposals made by the researchers below repre-
sent the examples of implementing this approach 
to the systemic risk measurement within the en-
tire financial system: Holl’o et al. (2012) – calcu-
lating the composite indicator of systemic stress 
(CISS); Ivanets (2017) – evaluating the systemic 
risk index as an integrated financial stability in-
dicator; Dumičić (2016) – formation of the accu-
mulation and consequence (or materialization) 
indexes of the systemic risk and their aggrega-
tion into the overall systemic risk index; Dungey 
et al. (2018) – developing the dynamic systemic 
risk index, taking into account the links among 
the risks faced by financial institutions. In turn, 
Hartmann et аl. (2005), Sum (2015), Van Oordt 
and Zhou (2015) etc. may be mentioned among 
the researchers who study the systemic risk issue 
in the banking system and, therefore, put for-
ward suggestions on its measurement using the 
methods that are in line with the third approach. 
For example, Hartmann et al. (2005) suggest as-
sessing the systemic risk in two directions. The 
first direction is based on recognizing the spill-
overs in the banking system (the infection risk, 
that is, the risk spreading from one bank to the 
other ones), and the second direction takes into 
account the influence exerted by banks on sys-
temic shocks. Van Oordt and Zhou (2015) also 
summarize two components while introducing 
the systemic risk assessment proposals: the first 
one reflects the bank risk level, and the second 
one refers to the strength of the bank’s connec-
tion with the banking system in the financial 
stress context. Sum (2015) emphasizes the possi-
bility of measuring the systemic risk by applying 
a z-score method, which illustrates the reduced 
revenue level of the banking system leading to its 
insolvency. The author notes that this approach 
does not cover the bank interconnections, which 
represents its disadvantage. However, according 
to Sum (2015), the z-score enables assessing the 
overall banking system reliability and, therefore, 
may serve as a measure for the tendency toward 
the systemic risk occurrence.
It should be noted that the methods consid-
ered within the three generalized approaches 
to measuring the systemic risk in the banking 
system do not contradict each other, but may 
provide different results if applied. In particular, 
Huang et al. (2015) confirm this upon review-
ing four methods for measuring the systemic 
risk (CoVaR, MES, and two indices identified 
according to the extreme value theory frame-
work that show a link between the possible bank 
defaults). When comparing the results of these 
methods, Huang et al. (2015) revealed discrep-
ancies in the obtained bank ratings formed ac-
cording to their systemic risk contributions. It 
is also worth bringing a focus on the existing 
restrictions related to the use of certain meth-
ods (in particular, the complexity of calculations 
using estimated parameters and market data at 
different development levels of financial mar-
kets) and the shortcomings typical for some of 
them (while ignoring certain aspects), which 
in turn requires developing more versatile and 
complex approaches to measuring the systemic 
risks. For this reason, scholars have been trying 
to improve and compile the existing methods 
in recent years. However, the complexity issue 
in this context is not the only one that requires 
a solution. The interpretation of the systemic 
risk assessment results needs to be enhanced, as, 
for example, it is mostly reduced to the deter-
mination of bank contributions to the systemic 
risk (through their contributions to the banking 
system losses under certain stressful conditions 
and to the relationships between banking insti-
tutions respectively) within the scope of the first 
and second approaches.
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2. METHODS
The conclusions drawn from the analyzed scientif-
ic literature provide a consecutive sequential ap-
proach to designing the aggregated systemic risk 
indicator in the banking system and interpreting 
the obtained results. According to the proposed 
approach, the analytical process, which requires 
the quantitative measurement of the systemic risk 
level in the banking system by designing the ag-
gregated indicator, is based on two positions. As 
follows from the first position, the systemic risk 
is produced when the systemically important 
banks are destabilized. Pursuant to the second 
position, interconnected SIBs catalyze the exac-
erbation and deployment of crisis phenomena in 
the banking system (the so-called “domino effect” 
implementation).
Based on the first position, the systemic risk may 
be measured quantitatively by summarizing the 
information on the operation riskiness levels of 
the systemically important banks. Among oth-
er factors, one can focus on assessing the finan-
cial risks that highlight the disturbance of banks 
and reflect their tendency toward default. The be-
low set of indicators was proposed to assess the 
financial risks of systemically important banks 
(Kuznyetsova & Pogorelenko, 2018): an immediate 
liquidity ratio (a liquidity risk); a share of foreign 
currency deposits in bank liabilities (a curren-
cy risk); a net interest margin (an interest risk); a 
share of credit impairment provisions in the credit 
portfolio (a credit risk); a share of security impair-
ment provisions in the security portfolio (an in-
vestment risk); a resource base instability ratio (a 
resource base stability risk).
Given that, in order to substantiate the require-
ments for the SIB operation, the international 
practice has determined the practicability of their 
differentiation according to the degree of system-
ic importance (in particular, this is highlighted in 
the method identifying global systemically impor-
tant banks, the G-SIBs; the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2018), the aggregated bank-












 – integral operation riskiness indi-
cators for each SIBs group that are differentiated 
according to their degree of systemic importance; 
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– weighting coefficients for the BSSRI compo-
nents; n – the number of SIBs groups.
IRSIB is calculated as the arithmetic average of in-
tegral operation riskiness indicators for systemi-
cally important banks that belong to the same 
group. In turn, the riskiness of each systemically 
important bank is assessed integrally using the 
entropy method (introduced by Kizim & Geymn, 
2008), according to which the integral indicator (I
j
 
as a generalization characteristic for a j object) is 











– entropy for the l characteristic; z
lj 
– a 
normalized value of the l characteristic for the j 
object; m – the number of characteristics used for 
the assessment. 
Justifying the weighting coefficients (а
і
) for the 
BSSRI components requires their ranking based 
on the degree of systemic importance of each bank 
group and their interconnectivity that affects the 
infection spread (according to the second position 
providing background for the developed approach 
to the systemic risk measurement). From this per-
spective, the weighting coefficients are clarified 
in three stages. At the first stage, the ranking de-
pends on the degree of systemic importance of 
bank groups. The second stage stipulates rank-
ing based on the summed up coefficients of pair 
correlations between the integral indicator values 
of the bank operation riskiness (that is, between 
the IRSIB
i
 values) calculated for each bank group. 
When the first and second stages are completed, 
the IRSIB
i
 weighting coefficients are determined 
by Fishburn’s criterion (Fishburn, 1970), and the 
third stage includes averaging of the weighting co-
efficients obtained through two rankings (the а
і
 
sum should be equal to 1).
It is worth noting that approaches to the systemi-
cally important bank identification are being im-
proved on a regular basis and come with different 
sets of criteria. At the same time, the bank asset 
volume continues to represent the key criterion 
for their classification as systemically important 
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banks (Capera et al., 2011; Haubrich & DeKoning, 
2017). Moreover, Report to the G-20 Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors (IMF, 
2009), Acharya et al. (2010), Borri et al. (2012), 
Yun and Moon (2014) point out that the size of 
banks significantly affects their contribution to 
the systemic risk. Therefore, within this approach 
to measuring the systemic risk in the banking sys-
tem, SIBs are determined with regard to the rec-
ommendations specified in Bezrodna and Lesik 
(2017), stating that a bank is considered systemi-
cally important if the share of its assets in the total 
assets of the banking sector (a bank’s size index) is 
equal to or greater than 3.5%. In view of this, the 
bank’s size index is regarded as a parameter for as-
sessing the bank systemic importance level. 
The number of identified SIBs in different nation-
al banking systems may vary significantly. In this 
light, the identification of a large number of sys-
temically important bank groups is inappropriate 
in relation to the proposals for the quantitatively 
measured systemic risk and further interpretation 
of the assessment results. Accordingly, banks are 
differentiated upon determining their relation to 
one of three groups – SIBs of first-order systemic 
importance (SIB
1
), SIBs of second-order systemic 
importance (SIB
2
) and SIBs of third-order system-
ic importance (SIB
3
). The arithmetic average of the 
systemic importance indicator for the identified 
systemically important banks is used to specify 
the requirements for grouping banks as a separa-
tion point (a differentiation criterion) (Bezrodna 
& Lesik, 2017). The banks with a systemic impor-
tance indicator higher than the arithmetic aver-
age should be attributed to the banks of first-or-
der systemic importance. On the other hand, the 
banks with a systemic importance level lower than 
the arithmetic average are re-differentiated by the 
average level of the systemic importance indicator 
(applicable for these banks). In other words, the 
distribution is iterated for the second time and the 
list of banks with the 2nd- and 3rd-order systemic 
importance is substantiated similarly to identify-
ing banks with the 1st-order systemic importance.
In regard to interpreting the systemic risk meas-
urement results in the banking system, it is appro-
priate to distinguish two blocks that will cover the 
following guidelines. Firstly, grading the aggre-
gated indicator values of the systemic risk and its 
components through correlation with qualitative 
levels (low, medium and high). Secondly, justify-
ing the bank supervision regime types based on 
the identified qualitative levels of operation riski-
ness for individual SIBs, and taking into account 
the degree of their systemic importance.
As a result, an interval scale is formed by the 
three-sigma method within the first block, follow-
ing on from the statistical characteristics (name-
ly, the arithmetic average (   X ), the mean squared 
deviation (σ), the median (Me) and the mode (Mo), 
the asymmetry ratio (As)) of the distributed IRSIB
i 
and BSSRI values. The features of defining the in-
terval scale boundaries with symmetric (or close 
to normal) and asymmetric distribution of the 
analyzed indicator values are given in formulas 
(3)-(5). 
Scale interval justification in the context of sym-
metric or close to normal data distribution (if the 
asymmetry ratio is less than 0.5 modulus): 
 3 ; 3 . X Xσ σ− +  (3)
Scale interval justification in the context of signif-
icant left-hand data asymmetry (the asymmetry 
ratio is greater than 0.5 and its value is negative):
( )3 1 ; 3 .Me k Me kσ σ− + +
 
(4)
Scale interval justification in the context of signif-
icant right-hand data asymmetry (the asymmetry 
ratio is greater than 0.5 and its value is positive):
( )3 ;  3 1 .Me k Me kσ σ− + +
 
(5)
As one can see, in contrast to formula (3), formu-
las (4) and (5), firstly use the median instead of 
the arithmetic average; and secondly, they use the 
corrective coefficient (k) proposed by Zinchenko 
(2007).
The supervision regime types (differing in the fre-
quency of on-site bank inspections) are to be de-
termined using the matrix approach (Figure 1) 
within the second block of proposals for interpret-
ing the systemic risk measurement results in the 
banking system. This stipulates using a 9-quad-
rant matrix (a modified McKinsey’s matrix), 
which is formed by the ratio of the operation riski-
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ness level (low, medium, high) for the systemically 
important bank and the degree of its systemic im-
portance (the first-, the second- and the third-or-
der systemic importance).
The interpretation below is given in accordance 
with the defined positioning of SIBs in the shaped 
matrix. When banks are placed in quadrants 1-3 
(meaning a high probability of the banking sys-
tem collapse), it is proposed to strengthen the su-
pervision regime over their operation (on-site in-
spections are organized every three months). On 
the other hand, when banks fall into quadrants 
4-6 and 7-9, it is advisable to introduce moderate 
and weakened supervision regimes, respectively. 
At the same time, the inspection frequency for the 
moderate regime is every six months, and for the 
weakened regime – once a year. 
3. EMPIRICAL  
RESULTS
The developed approach to measuring the sys-
temic risk in the banking system and interpreting 
the assessment results has been tested consider-
ing the financial risk indicators of the systemical-
ly important banks in Ukraine (for the period of 
2009–2018). Table 1 illustrates the conditions un-
der which SIBs are distributed by degree of their 
systemic importance. The list of systemically im-
portant banks as well as their asset share in to-
tal assets of the banking sector were determined 
annually as of January 1 (according to the NBU’s 
statistical reporting). The data presented in Table 
1 have been justified using a 2-stage iterative pro-
cedure for determining the average group asset 
share of SIBs. 
Degree of the SIB systemic importance







































Weakened supervision regime 
Figure 1. Matrix of the selected supervision regime types for systemically important banks
Table 1. Criteria for determining the relation of Ukrainian systemically important banks to three 
groups depending on the degree of their systemic importance 
Years
Asset share (Ai,%)  
of SIBs in total assets  
of the banking sector 
Criteria for determining the relation of SIBs to groups depending  
on the degree of their systemic importance
SIBs with  
the 1st-order systemic 
importance 
SIBs with  
the 2nd-order systemic 
importance 
SIBs with  




≥ 5.7 % 5.7% ˃ A
2





≥ 6.2 % 6.2% ˃ A
2





≥ 6.1 % 6.1% ˃ A
2





≥ 6.2 % 6.2% ˃ A
2





≥ 7.7 % 7.7% ˃ A
2





≥ 8.0 % 8.0% ˃ A
2





≥ 6.8 % 6.8% ˃ A
2





≥ 8.3 % 8.3% ˃ A
2





≥ 8.5 % 8.5% ˃ A
2





≥ 8.8 % 8.8% ˃ A
2




Banks and Bank Systems, Volume 14, Issue 3, 2019
http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/bbs.14(3).2019.04
Ukrainian systemically important banks were di-
vided into three groups according to the Table 1 
criteria, and calculations aimed at an integrated 
assessment of their operation riskiness were made 
by the entropy method (formula (2)) taking into 
account the financial statements at the end of the 
year (Table 2). 
The calculations given in Table 2 confirm the exist-
ing common tendencies in changing the quantita-
tive operation riskiness levels for each of the three 
SIBs groups within the analyzed period. In particu-
lar in 2014–2016, when the maximum integral indi-
cator values of the operation riskiness for systemi-
cally important banks (first-, second- and third-or-
der) were determined and their significant growth 





values (0.564 and 0.575, respec-
tively) were registered in 2016, and the maximum 
IRSIB
3 
value (0.553) was observed in 2015. 
Formula (1) shows that the integral operation 
riskiness indicators for SIBs with the considered 
weighting coefficients of the relevant parameters 
(Table 3) are synthesized for measuring the sys-
temic risk in the banking system. 
Justification of the weighting coefficients for the 
aggregated systemic risk indicator components 
confirmed the interconnectivity of the risks spe-
cific for systemically important banks, and, in 
accordance with the Chaddock’s scale, there is a 
positive high and noticeable correlation between 















– 0.655. Therefore, the pair cor-
relation coefficients sums taken into account when 
ranking the BSSRI components by the level of in-
terconnectivity between the systemically impor-





, 1.227 for IRSIB
3
. 
The aggregated systemic risk indicator value in the 
Ukrainian banking system was calculated using 
the data from Tables 2-3. The practical value and 
informativity of the results obtained while meas-
uring the systemic risk were confirmed through 
comparing the dynamics of change in the system-
ic risk level with the dynamics of change in the 
Bank assets to GDP (Figure 2). The use of the Bank 
assets to GDP (calculated using the reporting data 
provided by the State Statistics Service of Ukraine 
and the NBU) may be explained by the fact that 
it characterizes the banking system development 
level and its investment potential in terms of finan-
cial support for the real economy needs. Therefore, 
it may be considered as an information parameter 
Table 2. Findings illustrating quantitatively assessed operation riskiness of Ukrainian systemically 
important banks (within individual groups) 
Integral operation 
riskiness indicators  
of SIBs
Years
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
IRSIB
1
0.364 0.369 0.37 0.37 0.318 0.378 0.474 0.564 0.539 0.513
IRSIB
2
0.399 0.394 0.415 0.366 0.422 0.46 0.537 0.575 0.507 0.429
IRSIB
3
0.203 0.38 0.394 0.389 0.396 0.441 0.553 0.476 0.441 0.467
Table 3. Determination of weighting coefficients for the aggregated systemic risk indicator 






Criteria for ranking the BSSRI components and justifying their weighting 
coefficients
Weighting coefficient 
averages for the BSSRI 
components in two 
rankings
The systemic importance degree of 
bank groups
















1 0.5 2 0.3 0.4
IRSIB
2
2 0.3 1 0.5 0.4
IRSIB
3
3 0.2 3 0.2 0.2
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capable of reflecting the consequence scale asso-
ciated with the implemented systemic risk, that is, 
its materialization.
As can be seen from Figure 2, the direction of the 
change in the BSSRI and the Bank assets to GDP 
for the different periods are opposite to a greater 
extent. This is evidenced by the correlation be-
tween these indicators, which amounts to 0.85. 
From this perspective, it can be confirmed that the 
increase in the systemic risk level in the banking 
system leads to a decrease in the Bank assets to 
GDP.
The first block of recommendations on interpret-
ing the results of the quantitative systemic risk 
measurement represents a universal scale, which 
makes it possible to differentiate the levels of the 
aggregated systemic risk indicator in the banking 
system and integral operation riskiness indicators 
for SIBs. Since the data of the corresponding gen-
eralizing parameters were distributed with right-
hand asymmetry (the asymmetry ratio was equal 
to 0.57), formula (5) was used when designing the 
interval scale, and three intervals were obtained 







: [0; 0.417] – a low level, 
(0.417; 0.497] – a medium level, (0.497; 1] – a high 
level. Table 4 illustrates the interpreted systemic 
risk measurement results on the basis of the de-
signed scale.
According to Table 4, the following changes in the 
qualitative BSSRI levels occurred during the ana-
Figure 2. Dynamic changes in the aggregated systemic risk indicator  






























Bank assets to GDP, % BSSRI
2009 2010   2011  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016  2017 2018









2009 Low level Low level Low level Low level
2010 Low level Low level Low level Low level
2011 Low level Low level Low level Low level
2012 Low level Low level Low level Low level
2013 Low level Medium level Low level Low level
2014 Low level Medium level Medium level Medium level
2015 Medium level High level High level High level
2016 High level High level Medium level High level
2017 High level High level Medium level High level
2018 High level Medium level Medium level Medium level
44
Banks and Bank Systems, Volume 14, Issue 3, 2019
http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/bbs.14(3).2019.04
lyzed period: 2009–2013 – the systemic risk lev-
el in the Ukrainian banking system was low, in 
2014 and 2018 it was medium, and in 2015–2017 – 
high. In this context, attention should be paid to 
the set forth below when comparing the results 
of quantitatively and qualitatively measured sys-
temic risk in the banking system (Figure 2 and 
Table 4). A gradual increase in the BSSRI value 
was noted during 2012–2014, and, according to 
the calculations made, in 2014 the systemic risk 
level was interpreted as a medium one. Given 
this, one can conclude that the steady tendency 
toward approximating the quantitative value of 
the systemic risk indicator in the banking sys-
tem to the lower limit of the third interval of the 
developed scale (which determines the high sys-
temic risk level) indicates a high probability of 
its growth in the future and systemic crisis emer-
gence. For example, this was shown by the BSSRI 
value in 2014 (it was equal to 0.424 and close to 
the threshold of 0.497, according to the scale in-
terval (0.497; 1]) and confirmed through the ag-
gravating situation in the banking system during 
2015–2017. 
The second block of recommendations on inter-
preting the results of the quantitative systemic risk 
measurement represents the distribution of banks 
(identified as systemically important in 2018) (see 
Figure 3).
According to the determined positions of the 
systemically important banks recorded in the 
quadrants of the shaped matrix, it is advisable to 
strengthen the supervision regime over the oper-
ation performed by JSC CB PRIVATBANK, JSC 
Ukreximbank and JSC OSCHADBANK (got into 
quadrants 1-3), that is, to plan and organize on-site 
inspections once a quarter. In turn, moderate and 
weakened supervision regimes should be applied 
to JSB UKRGASBANK (quadrant 5) and PJSС 
FUIB (PUMB), JSC UkrSibbank, JSС Alfa-Bank 
and JSC Raiffeisen Bank Aval (quadrants 7-8) with 
on-site inspections every six months and once a 
year, according to each type of regimes. At the 
same time, it is worth noting that the determined 
intensity of the SIBs inspections may be reviewed 
and/or adjusted (for example, due to unsched-
uled inspections) taking into account the results 
of both off-site supervision (takes place on a reg-
ular basis) and stress testing of banks. Generally 
speaking, inspections (both general and themat-
ic) should result in the following: firstly, specified 
reasons that provoke a deteriorated financial situ-
ation in the systemically important banks, which 
may have a highly negative effect on the state of 
the entire banking system in the future. Secondly, 
specifying the deadlines for elimination of prob-
lems and recommendations on the financial reha-
bilitation for banks, in particular with regard to 
restructuring their assets and business processes. 































JSC Raiffeisen Bank Aval Quadrant 9
Figure 3. Positioning of the Ukrainian systemically important banks in the matrix “SIB operation 
riskiness level – Degree of the SIB systemic importance”
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CONCLUSION
It has been proposed to measure the systemic risk in the banking system with the formation of an aggre-
gated indicator by convoluted integral operation riskiness indicators for systemically important banks, 
divided into groups depending on their systemic importance. Determining the weighting coefficients 
for the components of the aggregated systemic risk indicator in the banking system took into considera-
tion the links between the financial risks specific for the systemically important banks and their degree 
of systemic importance. The following proposals were introduced with the aim to interpret the results of 
the quantitative systemic risk measurement: differentiation of the high, medium and low systemic risk 
levels; supervision over the SIBs operation.
The proposed approach is considered peculiar, since it can be used while developing macro-prudential 
policies and enables introducing practical recommendations for the systemic crisis prevention, moni-
toring the systemic risk level in the banking system and SIBs financial risks. For instance, first of all, its 
benefits include the available data to assess the systemic risk and simple implementation procedures as 
seen from the quantitative measurement position. Secondly, as for interpreting the assessment results 
for the presented approach, it is possible: to determine the threshold value of the aggregated systemic 
risk indicator (may serve as a marker for informing about the crisis phenomenon aggravation in the 
banking system in the future) according to the differentiated systemic risk levels; to determine the su-
pervision regime types for systemically important banks that differ in the intensity of the on-site inspec-
tions by supervisory bodies with the help of the shaped matrix “SIB operation riskiness level – Degree 
of the SIB systemic importance”. At the same time, the supervisory body, based on the results of deter-
mining the positions of systemically important banks in the designed matrix, has an option to review 
the inspection intensity, as well as apply additional and strengthened prudential requirements to banks 
(norms, capital buffers), which will contribute to ensuring their stability.
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